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Abstract: The introduction of a performance assessment model based upon the 
measurement of merit through explicit, standardized, and objective criteria of 
productivity has provoked significant changes in the academic profession within the 
public higher education in Portugal. Given that employment security was made con-
tingent upon obtaining adequate positive scores and promotion upon achieving max-
imum scores, a new institutional culture framed by precariousness and competition 
seems to have emerged. Moreover, as a consequence of austerity and with it the 
freezing of the pay awards associated with a promotion, the positive effects of ex-
cellent performance have been suppressed, while punitive measures for inadequate 
performance have been maintained. Based on ongoing qualitative research 
consisting of analysis of union position statements, interviews with union 
representatives, and interviews with academic staff of a Portuguese higher education 
institution, this article advances the hypothesis that evolution has taken place from 
resistance to routinization and acceptance of assessment procedures. 
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The recent development of public higher education (HE) in Portugal has been typical 
of the trends associated with New Public Management (NPM)-type reforms partic-
ularly with respect to the linkage of institutional development, competitivity, and 
success with academic output and, therefore, application of organizational strategies 
that link incentives to productivity with meritocratic reward based upon individual 
performance assessment (PA). Since 2007, organizational change in the context of 
public administration reform has provoked significant changes in the academic pro-
fession within the public HE in Portugal. The generalized introduction of models of 
PA based upon the measurement of merit through explicit, standardized and objec-
tive criteria of productivity has been exemplary of change in this context. Given that 
employment security was made contingent upon obtaining adequate, positive scores 
and promotion upon achieving maximum scores, a new institutional culture, framed 
by competition – and by risk, seems to have emerged. Moreover, as a consequence 
of austerity and, with it, the freezing of the pay awards associated with a promotion, 
the positive effects of high productivity and excellent performance were suppressed. 
Punitive measures for inadequate performance were, however, maintained. Thus, the 
application of PA is particularly symptomatic of how problems involved in the im-
plementation of NPM-inspired reforms have produced organizational change with 
significant impacts upon the academic profession. 
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This article, therefore, proposes to place the development of individual PA in the 
Portuguese public HE system within the context of the institutional and 
organizational changes associated with NPM-inspired reforms. It will address the 
challenges that this assessment system has placed upon academics and their reactions 
to it. In this context, it looks at the discourses produced by union organizations and 
union activists and their evolution since the inception of PA. It also presents the 
points of view of teachers themselves through an analysis of interviews with union 
activists and teachers obtained from a case study at a representative Portuguese pol-
ytechnical institution. Its analysis is based upon the hypothesis that a general evolu-
tion has taken place in unions’ and teachers’ behaviour and attitudes from resistance 
to routinization and acceptance of assessment procedures. Accordingly, the article 
begins with a look at the implementation of NPM reforms in public HE and then 
reviews the application of the new assessment models for teachers in the Portuguese 
system. 
PA of teachers and international organizational and 
management reforms in public HE 
Public HE systems have not escaped from international tendencies of management 
reform in public administration, such as organizational decentralization and auton-
omy, accountability and results-based management models. Indeed, the generalized 
influence and rising hegemony of NPM ideology, with its presumption of the 
superiority of private management models, together with the external pressures of 
context, provided fertile breeding ground for discourses regarding the 
ineffectiveness and indulgence of the traditional models of administration of public 
HE institutions (HEIs), supposedly founded upon the inefficient logics of academic 
development and collegiality (Barr, 2004; Lorenz, 2007). From these it has been easy 
to concludec—ideologically and not necessarily empirically—for the necessity of 
changing its existing management models as in the rest of public administration 
(Amaral, Magalhães, & Santiago, 2003; Anderson, 2008; Field, 2015; Kallio & Kal-
lio, 2014; Olssen & Peters, 2005; Pollitt, 2003; Reed, 2002) in favour of organiza-
tional decentralization and autonomy and a convergence upon a results-based model 
of human resources and careers. Thus, the decentralization of the system of HE was 
justified theoretically by equating organizational autonomy from uniform public tu-
telage with efficiency.  
As with the hospitals in public health systems (Stoleroff & Correia, 2008), 
decentralization and organizational autonomy give way to “marketization” and to 
increasing fragmentation of the system. Decentralized organizations produce dis-
crete development strategies, each acting as if it were a “private” entity and going 
its own competitive way.1 Moreover, the long-term and crisis-induced decrease in 
public financing of HEIs has further stimulated such competition by increasing 
organizational dependence upon self-generated funding (in particular from increas-
ing receipts from student tuition as well as private investment). Thus, although at-
tenuated by the still public character of much of the system, highly competitive ed-
ucational “markets” have emerged for the “products” of HE, thereby making neces-
sary the exercise of explicit hierarchical control over results at all levels of their 
operation—with the additional consequence that internal hierarchies have been re-
adjusted and reconstituted. In this context academic productivity becomes a key el-
ement to organizational competitivity and success and, consequently, systems of in-
dividual PA were almost universally introduced with the pretext of objectively meas-
uring the productivity of teachers and researchers. 
In short, the introduction of new management models in public institutions of HE 
                                                     
 
1 Rhoades & Slaughter (2004) refer to this phenomenon as “academic capitalism.” 
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has resulted in diverse and numerous organizational changes. However, the intro-
duction of new managerial principles into practice has often gone ahead without suf-
ficient attention being given to the limiting conditions for their application, and they 
may not adequately anticipate and respond to the complexity and limited rationality 
that characterize public organizations in particular (Reed, 2002). On the 
organizational level, a particularly relevant criticism holds that competition between 
decentralized organizations potentially jeopardizes the institutional cooperation that 
should be conducive to optimal academic and scientific development. Moreover, this 
competition may result in less efficient use of resources from a macro point of view, 
thus contradicting the goals of NPM itself, namely, an increase in the efficiency of 
the system as a whole.  
Another line of critical reasoning involves the unintended consequences of the 
administrative measurement of merit. In the NPM ideology optic, both scientific and 
teaching quality require an organizational climate that promotes, at least in 
attenuated form, “market” competition (Van Dalen & Henkens, 2012) that is based 
upon human resource management (HRM) models. This pressuposes external 
control and monitoring of activity is taken on by administrative structures, whose 
responsibility it is to supervise and verify their production through standardized 
measures and instruments. There is, however, a risk in that such control procedures 
are located within a conception of merit conditioned by quantity rather than quality. 
Indeed, some authors argue that such quantified criteria of assessment result in the 
over-valorization of quantity over quality (Kallio & Kallio, 2014; Olssen & Peters, 
2005; Stelmach & Wollf, 2011), to the extent that evaluation has become constrained 
by standardized scores based upon rankings and ratings (Lane, 2010). These may 
encourage conformism since publication norms tend to promote standard work ra-
ther than critical innovation (Coulthard & Keller, 2016; Sousa, 2011), potentially 
jeopardizing objectivity and integrity in publication choices (Fanelli, 2010) as well 
as individualism in research (Sousa, 2011). On the other hand, dependence upon 
sources of self-financing may constrain academic organizations’ decisions regarding 
their teaching and research to cater to the educational marketplace, leading them to 
approximate educational demand (Van Dalen & Henkens, 2012). Survival in an in-
creasingly competitive and uncertain market thereby transforms ratings and rankings 
into the instruments through which HEIs measure merit and are themselves evalu-
ated for merit (Stelmach & Wolff, 2011). Moreover, marketization may risk the in-
dependence of academic and scientific research and publication since projects, and 
the interpretation of results can be influenced by the priorities of private interests 
(Coulthard & Keller, 2016). These dynamics are a strong pressure on teachers and 
researchers and have a strong effect upon their motivations (Anderson, Johnson, & 
Saha, 2002). 
Although the advocates of NPM and HRM may like to juxtapose two distinct 
models, one being a new more efficient flexible, meritocratic model with a preceding 
bureaucratic-administrative model, in practice the new models have tended to add 
layers of regulations upon increasingly standardized procedures and measures in a 
strongly bureaucratic manner. The devolution of powers—which sought to reduce 
bureaucracy in HE management, devolving greater autonomy to the organizations— 
has paradoxically lead to the creation of new bureaucratic control mechanisms due 
primarily to the new demands for accountability (Pollitt, Birchall & Putman, 1998) 
and explicit external supervision of results (Santiago & Ferreira, 2012). The estab-
lishment of accreditation processes (Amaral et al., 2003; Reed, 2002) as well as of 
procedures for PA based upon standardized, quantified criteria (Kallio, Kallio, 
Tienari, & Hyvönen, 2016; Vicente & Stoleroff, 2016) are two examples of such 
mechanisms. These lead not to the elimination of bureaucratic control but rather to 
its displacement within systems and individual organizations.  
On the other hand, the introduction of managerial models within HE is frequently 
approached, in both the critical literature and professional discourse, as a rupture 
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with a preceding supposedly democratic and collegial peer-based model of evalua-
tion (e.g., Macfarlane, 2015). Collegiality here seems to refer to governance models 
dominated by peer relationships and in which decisions are taken on the basis of 
professional and scientific criteria in representative organs by colleagues who are 
normally elected to positions to serve roles for a limited period (Amaral et al., 2003). 
The question is whether this criticism is based fundamentally upon an idealization 
of a preceding organizational pattern purportedly characterized by looser profes-
sional regulation and is now, in hindsight, being remembered nostalgically as dem-
ocratic.2  
In order to get closer to discourses regarding change, in the following, we try to 
synthesize two different models (see Table 1) based upon an opposition between 
ideal types of models of administration that may hypothetically be extracted from 
discourses about governance models in public HE: a democratic-collegial model and 
a managerial-bureaucratic model (Bruckmann & Carvalho, 2014; Kallio & Kallio, 
2014; Olssen & Peters, 2005; Santiago & Carvalho, 2008; Schminank, 2005; Ter 
Bogt & Scapens, 2012; Van Dalen & Henkens, 2012; Vicente & Stoleroff, 2016). 
Although this opposition may appear somewhat simplistic, it does represent oppos-






Table 1  
Ideal types of administration models in HE 
 
Democratic-collegial model Managerial-bureaucratic model 
Institutional Management 
Emphasis on the code of public ad-
ministration/civil service and general 
framework for public HE system; 
Emphasis on internally generated statutes 
and regulations derived from a general 
framework for the public HE system; 
Dependence on public financing 
through the state budget; 
Mixed financing through the state 
budget, student tuition and self-generated 
receipts; 
Orientation towards academia; Gov-
ernance based on the presumption of 
the common good and public interest; 
Aloof from the community, independ-
ent of companies; 
Orientation towards the educational mar-
ket; 
Competition for students; 
Governance based upon market logic: 
with students as clients, teachers as ser-
vice providers;  
Proximity with community understood 
mainly as “the economy;” 
Democratic participation in organs of 
governance; 
Collegiality; 
Top-down formal leadership. 
Responsibility and power located in Di-
rectors of Units (Faculties, Departments, 
Centers); 
                                                     
 
2 Anderson et al (2002) argue that the term collegiality is abused as an evocation of an imag-
ined climate of harmony and intellectual collaboration that they refer to as contrived collegi-
ality, which in effect can be used as a counter-narrative or defensive tool in resistance to 
change (Fullan & Scott, 2009). Taylor (2008) argues that the fixation with collegiality is in 
part the result of a state of spirit and sense of loss that brings academics to reminisce upon a 
supposed (pre-NPM) golden era, thereby imagining that a previous collegial model has been 
presently supplanted by managerialism.  
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Democratic-collegial model Managerial-bureaucratic model 
Organizational Structure 
Centralization at macro and supra-or-
ganizational level (i.e., Ministry); 
Underdeveloped internal structure; 
Relative organizational autonomy and 
managerial decentralization; 
Developed internal structure; 
Relatively flat organizational struc-
ture; 
The primacy of collegial organs; 
 
Pyramidal organizational structure 
Importance of centrally emanated mana-
gerial hierarchy (from Rector to Deans 
and Chairs) ; 
Human Resource Management 
Non-explicit self-control of outputs of 
academic production; 
Explicit external control of academic 
production; 
Remuneration according to category, 
scale, service; 
Remuneration according to category, 
scale, service and bonuses for productiv-
ity; 
Administrative management of 
academic staff; 
The primacy of the civil service stat-
ute; 
Hybrid regimes of human resource man-
agement, including civil service regime 
and private law contracts; 
Stability of academic employment in 
accordance with public service em-
ployment regime. 
Tenure and employment stability linked 
to performance assessment. 
 
 
While reforms in public HE have forged ahead, supported by NPM’s more or less 
successful hegemony, and pushed on under the pressure of austerity, the theory and 
its implementation have been subject to significant practical professional resistance, 
as well as the academic criticism, especially as they have had visible consequences 
for HEIs and teaching careers. 
Teachers and the implementation of PA in public HE: from 
resistance to routinization 
Given what has been at stake for teachers in public HE with the introduction of a 
purportedly meritocratic system of PA that includes awards and penalties, it should 
not be surprising if its implementation has led to significant adaptations and 
adjustments in their behaviour, such as the adoption of the management language 
(Carvalho, 2012). On the one hand, this applies in the positive sense, when the in-
terested parties – especially when in possession of favourable resources – perceive 
opportunity and gain a hold on the game, foreseeing advantage and reward. How-
ever, this is even more valid in the negative sense since, employment security, for 
example, becomes dependent upon evaluation (Courtois & O’Keefe, 2015), espe-
cially in the polytechnic sector (Santiago & Carvalho, 2008). All of this further pro-
motes an increasingly competitive environment and, yet, may lead, in particular, and 
ironically, to complacency.3 Such complacency may then lead to routinization of the 
new practices. 
Fixed procedures fix expectations, and such routinization is partly what secures 
bureaucracy (Merton, 1957), permitting work to go ahead as planned. With time, 
routines and their underlying rules are internalized by the interested actors (Guidens, 
                                                     
 
3 Complacency arises, in accordance with Anderson (2008, p. 264), when, given the impos-
sibility of avoidance, academics may accept a situation pragmatically and strategically, even 
if minimally, which does not signify agreement. 
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1984) and their interests, such as promotion, will become dependent upon conform-
ity—which may also hold back risk and innovation (Merton, 1957), which is partic-
ularly problematic in academics and science. In this light, the system of individual 
PA becomes a bureaucratic instrument for the control of results, and the simultane-
ous effects of expectations of reward or avoidance of sanction will be dependent 
upon the degree of conformity with the norms and behaviour defined by the man-
agement system. Thus, such routinization of behaviour may and should have signif-
icant impacts on really-lived professionalism. What we may hypothesize therefore 
is a dualization of professional strategies as a function of the individual academic’s 
perception of opportunity or disadvantage in the situation, but altogether a break-
down of resistance through routinization. 
In the rest of this article, we will report upon research conducted in relation to 
our hypotheses, that is, the reflection of this process in union representatives’ and 
teachers’ discourses on organizational change and the consequences of PA. 
PA of teachers in Portuguese public HE  
Characterization of HE in Portugal 
In Portugal, until 1972 there were only four public universities (Lisbon, Coimbra, 
Évora and Porto) and a small, recently created Institute of HE (ISCTE in Lisbon) 
(Torgal, 2012). Following democratization in 1974, HE rapidly expanded in re-
sponse to a massive increase in demand (Amaral et al., 2003; de Almeida, 2012). At 
present, the public system consists of 39 institutions (13 universities, a university 
institute, 15 polytechnical institutes, and five schools that are not integrated within 
either universities or polytechnical institutes (General Direction of Higher Education, 
2017). These institutions are under the tutelage of the Ministry of Higher Education 
and Science. They all may confer Bachelors and Masters degrees while only the 
universities are entitled to confer doctorates.  
During the dictatorship of 1933-1974, the regime tightly controlled the universi-
ties allowing them very little autonomy. Rectors were appointed directly by the gov-
ernment, and the organs of governance were hardly representative of the faculty (de 
Almeida, 2012). The democratization of the country resulted in concomitant 
democratization of the governance of HEIs, approximating a democratic-collegial 
model and obtaining a high degree of academic liberty and scientific and pedagogic 
autonomy. There was, therefore, a significant delegation of decision-making to the 
institutions themselves, extending even to financial and administrative matters, alt-
hough many fundamental decisions, such as the creation of courses, the number and 
distribution of students to be enrolled or the creation of teaching lines for hiring, 
remained subject to ministerial approval. Nevertheless, by the beginning of the 
1990s, managerial principles, at least at a rhetorical level, began to make their way 
into a political debate and effective practice (Bruckmann & Carvalho, 2014), pre-
paring the way for important changes to the traditional model by the 2000s (Amaral 
et al., 2003). Subsequently, and in the wake of OECD recommendations for publicly 
financed institutions to operate within the private market (Kauko & Diogo, 2011), 
their administrative and management models were altered relatively rapidly along 
the lines of NPM (Bruckmann & Carvalho, 2014; Diogo & Bruckmann, 2015), with 
the passage of the Law Nr. 62/2007 creating the Judicial Regime for HEIs (RJIES). 
The main changes in the new framework produced a top-down structure of power 
and authority and included numerous derivative changes in the organizations of HE 
(Araújo et al., 2014; Diogo & Bruckmann, 2015; Kauko & Diogo, 2011; Santiago & 
Carvalho, 2011; Vicente & Stoleroff, 2016) as can be seen in Table 2. 
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Table 2  
Main changes introduced by RJIES 
 
Governance The concentration of decision-making power within 
a reduced number of organs and, especially, the 
strengthening of the powers of the university rectors 
and presidents of the polytechnical institutes; 
A significant decrease in the number of members 
constituting the government structures of the insti-
tutions, namely in the General Councils and the 
Management Councils; 
The introduction of external stakeholders into the 
management organs; 
The introduction of the modes of a selection of 
members of governing bodies, making it possible 
for some to be designated or co-opted from above; 
Professionalization of certain managerial functions 
and administrative leadership (supervisors, 
directors and the like). 
Management Creation of an option between two institutional 
models: the public institute regulated by public law 
and the foundation regulated by private law; 
Introduction and regularization of reporting and 
other instruments for accountability; 
Viabilization of formalized cooperation and consor-
tia between institutions. 
  
Funding Linking institutional budgets to productivity 
through financing contracts with the state; 
Possibility of autonomous fixing of tuition, includ-
ing the possibility of tuition increases. 
  
Human Resources Transformation of the civil service status of teachers 
and administrative staff to public employees; 
Introduction of Performance Assessment of aca-
demic personnel. 
The introduction of PA into HE  
Academic and scientific endeavour is necessarily subject to evaluation by peers, and 
academic careers are therefore inherently meritocratic (Ter Bogt & Scapens, 2012). 
Assessment of academics’ work, therefore, involves evaluation procedures that, to 
some degree, are familiar to the field and expected. However, previous systems of 
assessment in the Portuguese public sector tended to derive from bureaucratic sys-
tems of personnel administration review derived from the statutory conditions of the 
civil service employment contract and based upon loose, qualitative assessments 
made by supervisors—and even these were pretty much informally applied in aca-
demic contexts or not at all. In NPM-inspired discourse, this internal control of per-
formance was over-determined by the job security attendant upon civil service status. 
Security purportedly functioned as a disincentive to productivity and excellence and 
weakened the meritocratic dynamic conjured up by the familiar expression publish 
or perish, perversely inducing accommodation and productivity fall-off, allowing 
academics who had acquired civil service status to rest upon their laurels (Vicente 
& Stoleroff, 2016). In this sense, and in the optic of NPM ideology, both scientific 
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and teaching quality were in need of an organizational climate that promotes com-
petition based upon human resource management models in which external control 
and monitoring of activity is taken on by administrative structures, whose responsi-
bility is to supervise and verify their production through standardized measures and 
instruments (Vicente & Stoleroff, 2016). This NPM view of the positive function of 
meritocratic assessment was largely transported to a revision of the Career Estatutes 
of Teachers and Researchers in HE that necessarily followed the passage of the 
RJIES. 
The revision of the Career Estatutes took place in 2009. Amongst other alterations, 
the revision entailed the institutionalization of evaluation based upon the assessment 
of pre-determined quantitative objectives distributed among the four areas repre-
sentative of teachers’ activity: teaching, research, participation in organizational 
management bodies and services extended to the community. PA measures were to 
be put into effect through the elaboration, operationalization and implementation in 
each institution of a regime of regulations for PA (designated a RAD). The coordi-
nation of the process was to be led by the Scientific Councils in the universities and 
by the Technical-Scientific Councils of the Polytechnical Institutes and, according 
to the law, the RAD for each institution was to be initially negotiated with the teach-
ers’ unions. 
The decentralization and autonomy attained by the institutions led to diverse re-
gimes throughout the system. Nevertheless, the following characteristics are com-
mon to almost all: 
 
 a certain uniformity in the weighting of scores amongst the four areas of 
teaching activity, with a tendency to value teaching and research activi-
ties; 
 similarities in the items of assessment that had been operationalized for 
each of the areas of activity; 
 a certain standardization of the criteria for evaluating teachers irrespec-
tive of their professional category, scientific area, degrees or seniority;  
 standardization of the scales for assessment results such as three or four 
levels for positive assessment and only one negative level; 
 a prevalence for assessment over three-year periods; 
 some sort of inclusion of students’ evaluation of teachers, usually based 
on annual or bi-annual questionnaires; 
 the presence of some form of self-assessment by teachers through report-
ing of activities or registering of results and its delivery to an organ (such 
as a department chair) with responsibility for its validation. 
 
Diversity in the institutions’ regimes entails aspects such as the existence of quo-
tas for the proportion of teachers who may obtain the highest gradings per unit or the 
application of assessment to part-time teachers. 
The effects of austerity measures in teachers’ PA 
Legitimated by the economic and financial crisis that swept through several Euro-
pean countries, such institutional and organizational reforms were, more recently, 
followed by austerity, which can be said to have simultaneously reinforced and dis-
torted the logics of change, constraining the chances and conditions necessary for 
their consolidation (Lodge & Hood, 2012; Stoleroff, 2013). On the one hand, aus-
terity increased the competitive pressures upon organizations for survival. However, 
austerity also threatened professional alliances, that would have been crucial for the 
transition to the new models, and jeopardized the levers and positive incentives for 
continued reform. If it was already problematic to introduce changes in the manage-
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ment of academic work and careers, austerity posed complex challenges to the mer-
itocratic reconstruction sought by the reforms and, in particular, by the introduction 
of individual PA.  
The austerity policies introduced in Portuguese public HE (Teixeira & Koriakina, 
2016)—as in the rest of the public sector—ended up limiting the implementation of 
the PA system. Budget restrictions promoted the emphasis upon measurement of 
productivity, particularly, as a criterion for promotion (as promotions across the sys-
tem involve significant costs). However, these budgetary restrictions have been in-
voked to suppress or freeze the positive effects, such as promotions and bonuses, for 
superior assessment. As a result, PA under austerity was transformed into a funda-
mentally punitive system, or at least could be perceived as such. This promoted, 
above all else, strategies for avoiding insufficient results in evaluation or, especially 
amongst those who become tired of the competition, strategies for sufficing and be-
haviour based upon just getting by, since better results produce no tangible career or 
immediate material advantages.  
We are, therefore, faced with circumstances which permit us to advance 
hypotheses considering resistance and acceptance of this major reform in the 
academic profession and its career: an evolution has taken place from resistance to 
innovation to routinization and acceptance of assessment procedures 1) that is 
reflective of the underlying differentiation of academics to the new professional 
stratification processes in accordance with their varying adaptive capacities and that 
2) is reflected in the discourses of teachers’ professional representatives. 
Methods 
Teachers unions’ and teachers’ views on PA: some research 
Based on our research, we will now examine the perspectives of the teachers’ unions 
and their activists regarding the assessment system implemented in Portuguese pub-
lic HE. We look at their evolution from the start of the process until the conclusion 
of the first cycle of evaluation. We will then report on the viewpoints of teachers 
themselves, taken from a specific case study, regarding the rules and process applied 
in their institution as well as assessment in general.  
There are two representative union structures in public HE. The National Feder-
ation of Teachers (FENPROF) was formed in 1983, federating various regional 
teachers’ unions that were organized in the aftermath of democratization, aggregat-
ing teachers from all levels of the educational system. It is affiliated in the national 
CGTP confederation. The National Union for HE (SNESup) was created in 1989, 
following a wave of dissatisfaction with the performance of FENPROF in the nego-
tiation of the Teachers Career Statute and the resulting aspiration of many teachers 
to have a union dedicated solely to HE (Lourtie, 2015). SNESup is an independent, 
national union. Each of the unions submitted opinions regarding the RAD conceived 
for each institution, explaining its position. 
With respect to the positions of the unions, in addition to analysis of union doc-
uments, we interviewed a set of union activists in order to get a more general sense 
of the organizational dynamics involved in the implementation of the evaluation sys-
tem nationally and in order to complement the information collected through the case 
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study of a specific institution. We interviewed 18 union activists from diverse insti-




Identification of union interviewees cited in the analysis 
 
Interview Union Scientific area Holds leadership position 
A SNESup Social Science x 
B Fenprof Engineering x 
C SNESup Mathematics  x 
D SNESup Social Science x 
E  SNESup Sciences  
F SNESup Social Science x 
G SNESup Law  
H SNESup Sciences  
I  SNESup Engineering  
J SNESup Management  
K SNESup Social Science x 
L Fenprof Sciences x 
 
 
Finally, as part of a case study of a HEI, semi-directive interviews were also con-
ducted with a sample of 30 teachers (N=180) from a representative polytechnical 
institute that had implemented individual PA biannually since 2011. The option to 
do a case study in a polytechnical institute was due to an interest in developing 
sociological research specifically in this under-studied sub-system of HE in Portugal 
and an interest in researching the particularities in the application of an assessment 
regime in this sub-system, which is characterized by a high degree of precarity in 
employment relations (a higher proportion of teachers on non-permanent contracts), 
less experience in scientific research activity and significantly lower academic 
credentials among its teaching staff. The specific institution was chosen due to the 
opportunity afforded by the approval of the institution’s administration. The choice 
of using the interview method was adequate towards the goal of carrying out an 
exploratory and intensive analysis of the positions of the main actors involved in the 
assessment process, taking into account that, while research has been done on other 
measures of NPM reform in the academic context (e.g. Amaral, Tavares, & Santos, 
2013; Bruckmann, 2017; Bruckmann & Carvalho, 2014; Carvalho & Videira, 2017; 
Santiago & Carvalho, 2008; Santiago, Carvalho, & Sousa, 2015), to our knowledge, 
there do not as yet exist other studies of this object within the panorama of 
Portuguese HE. The sample of participants in the study was constructed intentionally 
based upon the following criteria: discipline, contract status, professional category, 
employment regime (full or part-time), and academic degree. The interviews were 
                                                     
 
4 The selection of the interviewees was made with the assistance of the unions. The first 
interviews were carried out between October 2014 and October 2015 and, in order to analyse 
the evolution of union and activists’ positions, a new round of interviewing was carried out 
between October 2016 and February 2017 with the same activists who had been previously 
interviewed. 
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conducted between November 2015 and March 2017. The sample was diversified 
by both academic discipline (law, accounting, management, finance, languages, and 
computer science) and type of contract (full-time with exclusivity, full time and part-
time). 
Results 
This analysis will focus on four aspects of the issues at hand: 1) the positions and 
conduct of the teachers’ unions in relation to PA; 2) opinions of the interviewed 
union activists; 3) the opinions of the interviewed teachers regarding the 
implementation of the new models of PA applied in their institution; and 4) the 
possible sources of accommodation and acceptance behaviours with regard to PA. 
Union positions on the system of PA 
An analysis of the unions’ positions is indispensable for an understanding, at the 
least, of discourses around the issue.  
Analysis of the unions’ position papers leads to the conclusion that both 
FENPROF and SNESup, on the one hand, considered, at least officially, that the 
implementation of assessment would be inevitable due to the competitive and 
meritocratic character of the teaching and research careers and, on the other, 
challenged the legal basis of the system alleging, in a similar fashion to the critical 
sociological arguments, that it posed serious threats to academic professionalism, as 
can be understood from the following excerpts. 
 
We do not refuse evaluation but consider that an exclusively individual evalua-
tion, according to the models that have been proposed by the various institutions 
[based upon the quantification of results], is not justified,… since it will produce 
competition, fear and the destruction of any notion of collective work. (Position 
of SPN/FENPROF on the regulations of performance assessment, March 2010) 
 
One of the fundamental tasks of our careers is evaluation: all of us evaluate, and 
we are, always have been, evaluated.… Before evaluating it is necessary to know 
what evaluation is for, what are the intended goals to be reached. (SNESup, De-
bate on Performance Assessment in Higher Education, 2010) 
 
One of the most criticized principles was the quantification of teachers’ productivity 
(according to the four fields of evaluation: teaching, research, managerial roles, and 
extension) since it leads, in their view, to a decrease in academic autonomy and a 
weakening of professional powers as well as to a “proletarianization” of teaching 
and research work, subjecting it to managerial criteria for an assessment defined 
externally and hierarchically: 
 
many academics publish because they desperately need these publications to 
hold onto their job, so they can continue to research or be promoted and earn 
more money.… No serious and honest system of assessment can leave out a rig-
orous and thoughtful analysis of the content of the work of an academic,… which 
is contrary to the idea of permanent assessment that is based upon metrics, which, 
for its part, encourage bad practices. (SNESup, on Performance Assessment in 
Higher Education, 2010) 
 
The enormous waste of time and the concomitant displacement of energy to fulfil 
the requisites of evaluation are going to irreparably and radically alter the main 
functions and objectives of teachers. (Opinion of SPN/FENPROF on the RAD 
proposed by the Universidade do Porto, 2010) 
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The initial positions of union activists to the introduction of PA 
The analysis of the discourse of the activists in the first round of interviews revealed 
a significant variety of positions in relation to the system that was implemented, even 
amongst members of the same union organization, varying between resistance and 
full acceptance, as is demonstrated in the following excerpts. 
 
1. Resistance 
Three of the interviewed activists expressed their rejection of the system of evalua-
tion following the alteration of the teachers’ career statute without recognizing any 
value for the profession.  
 
Metrics are not fair. It is not a fair system.… The regulation of performance ap-
praisal has put colleagues against colleagues. [The appraisers] assume the power 
of surveillance and pressure. (A) 
 
I think that [the system of assessment] is harmful! (C) 
 
I am completely against these regimes of performance appraisal. (D) 
 
2. Partial acceptance 
In contrast with the previous views, the majority of the interviewed activists 
recognized the importance of performance assessment for the teachers’ career, ac-
cepting the existence of a system geared towards this end. Nevertheless, they ex-
pressed disregard for some of the rules of the system as implemented as well as the 
manner in which it has been implemented in various institutions, such that their po-
sition is to be considered as of partial acceptance. 
 
We understand that the existence of performance appraisal is very important.… 
But, one thing is to say that, and another is to say that any appraisal is ok. It is 
not that! There are principles that have to be followed in the assessment. (B) 
 
I think that these regulations for performance assessment nowadays are indispen-
sable. How can we assure the control, verification and validation of the work of 
others if we don’t have these tools?... at the level of putting them into practice the 
things end up with worse results.… These regulations always have a tendency 
that is for a certain uniformity. (D) 
 
With regard to performance assessment, in general, I’m in favour.… In theory, 
evaluation for merit seems right to me, evaluation by peers, and that career ad-
vancement be made through evaluation mechanisms. (G) 
 
3. Total acceptance  
Activist E, on the other hand, expressed total acceptance of the implemented assess-
ment system, stating that he had participated (as a teacher and not a union repre-
sentative) in some of the phases of the conception of the assessment regime in the 
institution where he works. This participation may have contributed to the inter-
viewee’s acceptance of the rules applied in his institution. 
 
Before the new RJIES and the new teaching career statute, in this institution, there 
was no evaluation.… My opinion is that teachers should be evaluated and, there-
fore, I think it’s positive to introduce assessment.… I agree with this assessment 
in the form in which it is taking place … by objectives. (E) 
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From initial resistance and fear to acceptance and conformism 
The second round of interviews of the activists revealed a general posture of 
accommodation or acceptance in discourse, even amongst the present leaders of 
these organizations, as can be read in the following examples: 
 
Performance appraisal right now stands more for conformism [on the part of ac-
ademics] than for something else.… The Union also has been affected by that.… 
The theme of evaluation took up a lot of [time] in our board meetings. Now it no 
longer does. (A) 
 
We could also detect outright acceptance as expressed in the interview with B: 
 
We know what was the main reason [for P.A. implementation]—to prevent 
people to progress [in the career], which is motivating because it stimulates 
people not to rest. (B) 
 
With respect to the remaining union activists, the results seem to point towards an 
evolution of positions, from initial fear with the introduction of assessment to either 
accommodation or acceptance following its application. This observation is 
reinforced by the positions expressed by even some union activists, such as E and F. 
 
We no longer hear much [talk] about PA internal rules by academics, which is an 
indicator of a greater acceptance. (E) 
 
At that point [of the take-off of the assessment process], I think that fear was 
greater because people also did not know what type of consequences assessment 
could have.… [At this point], people have no concerns and, somehow, they ac-
cept the mechanism. (F) 
The positions of teachers 
The 30 interviews conducted in the case study also revealed a diversity of positions 
amongst teachers in relation to the system of assessment introduced in their institu-
tion, similarly varying between resistance (Academic 1), partial acceptance (Aca-
demic 2) and acceptance (Academic 3).  
 
People are not measured only by numbers. There are multiple dimensions through 
which an academic … can be evaluated and not only on quantitative terms. And 
this [system] is purely and systematically quantitative! (Academic 1) 
 
The quantitative part of assessment of teaching to me doesn’t seem inadequate. 
It seems to me that they should make the criteria between evaluators uniform. 
(Academic 2)  
 
I don’t see any inconvenience in the quantitative approach.… It is a way to 
guarantee that performance appraisal is more objective. (Academic 3) 
 
The posture of accommodation/acceptance of the assessment system, observed in 
the opinions of the activists, is also shown in the discourse of some of the teachers 
interviewed in the case study, as is exemplified by Academic 3, a full-time teacher, 
with a fixed term contract who is not on permanent staff:  
 
At the beginning, there was a little tumult, but then we saw how [the appraisal 
system works], the criteria, and since then it has been not a big problem. (Aca-
demic 4) 




This result corresponds with our hypothesis, showing that the perspectives of the 
teachers evolved from initial resistance and fear to a position of accommodation or 
passive acceptance. Confronted with this evidence, we think it is important to iden-
tify the main causes of this phenomenon, through the analysis of discourse of all the 
participants in this study as described in the next point. 
Possible sources for accommodation and acceptance 
In the course of the interviews with union activists and the participants in the case 
study we identified various phenomena which, in their opinion, constitute possible 
causes for the accommodation and/or acceptance of the system of performance as-
sessment. These will be described in the following. 
 
1. Attenuation of the consequences of the results of the assessment 
The implementation of evaluation did not fulfil the expectations for positive ef-
fects—rewards—for the highest levels of performance, namely promotion and ca-
reer advancement. 
 
Although academics have been evaluated, there were no positive effects. That is, 
teachers with high enough scores to allow them to progress were not promoted. 
(C) 
 
We didn’t notice anything!… In terms of career progression, it is all frozen! (Ac-
ademic 5) 
 
Although this phenomenon, derived from austerity, may lead to discouragement 
among teachers, leading them to question the ends of such assessment (Marsden, 
2004), it may also serve to induce accommodation to the system in operation.  
 
The fear ended up wearing off because there were neither positive or negative 
consequences. (F) 
 
The representatives of the teachers indicate that colleagues could not understand the 
benefits of the implementation of a system of assessment, but that this question is 
not present in the immediate concerns of the teachers or the unions themselves. 
 
They do not reach us here [many complaints in relation to performance assess-
ment]. The problems that we’ve had here recently have to do with employment—
the short term hiring and the risk of losing employment, which has been quite 
high. (B)  
 
2. PA perceived as a discredited administrative procedure 
In addition to the above, PA is coming to be seen by teachers as a mere, though 
mandatory, administrative procedure, that has already been discredited by various 
actions.  
 
This is a make-believe! It produces no effects. Why do you implement something 
that has no effects?! (Academic 6) 
 
Neither the appraisers nor the appraised face this with any responsibility. It is not 
looked upon seriously. (L) 
 
3. Routinization of behaviour  
 
The routinization of behaviour associated with the implementation of the system of 
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PA, which is manifested in the assimilation and internalization of expectations, is 
indicated by some of the interviewed as a factor promoting accommodation and re-
ducing apprehension. 
 
[Academics] have incorporated the mechanism and today they are generally pre-
pared to fill in evaluation forms. (F) 
 
The results also revealed the emergence of new practices and the acceptance of a 
new language of management (Carvalho, 2012), such as the frequent counting of the 
number of publications, the strategic selection of journals, in accordance with the 
scores attributed to them in the assessment regulations, to which to submit articles, 
the concern with taking on tasks that bring points, amongst others. 
 
4. Homogeneity of grading  
 
Another factor pointed out as a motive for accommodation to the system has to do 
with the relative absence of differentiation in the grading attributed to teachers fol-
lowing the application of the assessment procedures. This may create the perception 
amongst the assessed that competition amongst peers is less acute than it may 
actually be. 
 
The evaluation results of teachers were, in general, globally very positive and, 
therefore, the fears haven’t been felt. (F) 
Conclusion 
The results of the research reported here point to heterogeneous perspectives in 
relation to the implementation of the present system of PA of teachers in public HE. 
We repeat, this diversity of opinions is noticeable even among the union activists 
(themselves academics of course), whose organizations’ initial official positions 
were fairly critical of the introduction of the procedures. This may demonstrate the 
adoption of diverse strategies on the part of teachers and researchers in order to deal 
with the changes introduced to the profession (de Bruijn, 2002). However, the atten-
uation, until now, or even the absence, of positive effects for higher performance - 
due to austerity measures, does not make it easy to understand the purpose of such a 
system of teacher assessment (Behn, 2003), which is, as a result, perceived by many 
of those involved as a mere administrative procedure, required by law, but with not 
much credibility. With the institutionalization of the system, teachers’ and even the 
union activists’ reactions seem to have evolved from initial fear and rejection to rou-
tinization, which has in turn lead to the assimilation of the rules and their apparent 
integration into the expectations of daily academic life. In this context, the fulfilment 
of rules becomes a focal point of behaviour, as Merton (1957) pointed out in his 
seminal analysis of bureaucracy, taking precedence in relation to the substantive re-
sults. In a sense, therefore, PA becomes transformed for many into an instrument to 
assure continuity of employment, the maintenance of a status quo in an increasingly 
competitive and unstable environment, in which there are only negative effects for 
insufficient performance. At present, we still cannot project to what will be the re-
actions of the academic community to a post-austerity situation where positive ef-
fects for high performance are added to the negative, especially if such a situation 
brings quotas for the superior grading. 
In light of this analysis, the application of systems of PA in public HE, based 
upon quantification of academic productivity through objective criteria and 
standardized instruments, seems to have become a routine practice in everyday life 
of HEIs and their academic staff. Therefore, the results of this institutionalization 
may not correspond to the ends that were originally intended for this management 
Stoleroff & Vicente: Performance assessment and change in the academic profession 
www.professionsandprofessionalism.com 
Page 16 
strategy, that is, as an incentive to excellence and as a compensation for merit. In 
other words, if despite this, academics continue to strive to show their merit and 
excellence in their work, for now, it is not principally due to this HRM device. 
In spite of the relevance of the results of our research, the fragmentation of the 
assessment process (due to the autonomy of each institution in elaborating its model 
and regulations) and the different stages at each of the 39 institutions in the imple-
mentation of the system, there are important limits to the generalizations that can be 
made. For this reason, it would be important to engage in further research involving 
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